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RUDI SUPEK

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# EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS

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EUROPE — THE CONTINENT WHICH HAS  
LOST ITS LEADING POSITION

Viewed mythologically, Europa is to us that charming female figure being borne on the back of a mighty bull. But to all intents and purposes, it seems that Europe has fallen from the bull's to a donkey's back! It lags today in scientific and technical progress so far behind the states of North America that experts give it not the slightest chance of successfully competing in the years to come. The main reason for such a pessimistic estimate is given as its disunity — political, economic and cultural. Which Europe are we speaking of? Naturally and above all, the one which strives to comprehend its situation from the standpoint of the Western European countries, which then attempts to encompass the socialist countries, on condition that the Soviet Union, as a "Euro-Asian super-power" is excluded, naturally with the concession that the same be done with the United States as a power which considers itself called upon to maintain the "European balance". But let us for the present try to abstract ourselves from these "relations of power" and take the attitude of a "traditional European".

Addressing Europeans (without the Soviet Union!) a representative of the well-known MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) in the USA, Mr. W. Griffith, very frankly voiced his thesis that he sees no opportunities for Europe's being able to compete with the USA in the fields of scientific and technological progress. He supported this claim with numbers which show that the USA spends much more on scientific research than all the European countries (again excluding the Soviet Union)

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put together. He noted, for instance, that 25 billion dollars of the 75 billion approved by the American Senate for the military budget goes to meet the expenditures for scientific and technological research. Another indication of American supremacy in technology is the fact that it produces 75% of the computers of the entire world production. The French Boule recently had to capitulate in the face of IBM, and only the English still attempt to maintain some semblance of independence in this production. There was no need for him to cite the fact that in the past ten years, some 60,000 European scientists and researchers crossed the ocean and found employment in the USA. What these figures mean, an what such an "exhaustion" of European scientific and technological potential means for economic and social development needed no explanation for any of the scientists in the auditorium. This fact can, of course, be confronted with the demand for the speediest possible unification of European scientific and technological forces in the most expensive industry. Mr. Griffith said that, as an American, he had nothing against such a unification, but that, unfortunately, in the face of the existing ideological and political disunity of Europe, he saw not the slightest possibility of such a unity being attained!

The talks held at the "European Seminars", (which were organized by the University of Brighton, England), as well as those which are being, or will be held at such and similar events, should show whether pessimism in this sense is justified, i.e. whether Europe has definitely lost its once leading role, and whether it is truly incapable of settling the problems which will not only preserve its scientific and technological potential, but also return the ideological-political role which it held in the world in modern times. These problems today manifest themselves in three basic forms: the relationship of the Western European countries towards their own integration and towards the USA (particularly in the military-political sense), the relations of socialist and non-socialist countries in Europe, and the relations of the European countries and the Third World.

#### EUROPE — A FEDERATION OR A "COMMUNITY OF HOMELANDS"?

There can be no doubt that the discussion on European integration is today evolving in an atmosphere of political detente, that a revival of the "cold war" on the line dividing socialist from non-socialist Europe seems a little improbable, even to pessimistically inclined politicians; and that the issue of new relations among European nations has once more become current. This

means, primarily, that some of the old concepts on integration, which were based on the bloc division of Europe, are in a crisis. As is known, this crisis was caused by General de Gaulle with France's withdrawal from NATO and the definition of Europe as stretching from "the Atlantic to the Urals". The concept of Europe restricted only to the Western European countries with a firm reliance on the USA has evidently become too narrow and politically invalid.

Some internal contradictions rose to the surface with the easing of bloc tensions, both in the East and in the West. Bloc strategians attempted to conceal them. Thus the idea of building up strong economically integrated Western Europe with the "European Economic Community" (the plan of Jean Monnet and the "six" as the core) over which a political superstructure would according to the same logic, with a joint European parliament and a "super-government" in the form of a European federation, has entered a crisis. The supporters of European federalism conceived the transfer from the economic to the political level too simply. They forgot that such a concept pre-supposed at the same time a firmly integrated and controlled West Germany, which would mean an eternal division of Germany, and the confirmation of the American Atlantic strategy regardless of whether it is a strategy of American monopoly over the "atomic umbrella" or a strategy "on two pillars". It became increasingly clear that the young generations in Germany were devoting more and more thought to the unification of the halved parts of their homeland.

Economic integration showed up various contradictions not only among the Six, but also between the CEE and EFTA, i.e. between the European Economic Community and the Free Trade Association. The member countries of the CEE, both European and African, could not, by their very geo-political and economic position (let us take Greece or Turkey as an example) be taken into account for the integration processes provided for in the Monnet plan. Furthermore, the neutral countries (Sweden, Austria, Switzerland) showed no desire, for political reasons, to enter an economic community which would serve as an infrastructure for NATO. Finally, France's changed orientation brought the entire plan into question. A heated discussion developed between federalists and de Gaulleists at the "European Seminar" in Grenoble. Maurice Duverger (Paris) defended the de Gaulleist concept, noting that in integration processes one should take into account the national and cultural aspirations of individual countries and that the integration process itself should be

conceived much more elastically than is the case with orthodox theoreticians of federalism. He particularly opposed the thesis that the economic and political integration of Western Europe is a precondition for negotiations between Western and Eastern European countries, pointing out the significance of bilateral, and not exclusively bloc negotiations. Théo Lefevre, former Belgian Prime Minister, took the orthodox federalist stand shared by many Christian Democrats with their theoretician Maurice Schumann. He said: "The division of Europe into two parts is very real. It is first necessary to constitute a Europe of the six (or seven) and only then can one turn to relations with the East." In answer to the remark that an insistence on strict integration is primarily the thesis of "small states", he said: "There are only small states in Europe. Some are aware of it, and others refuse to be!" The federalists reject de Gaulle's thesis that Europe must be "a community of homelands", i.e. that it is necessary to pay more heed to national features and cultural tradition. The discussion showed that the view that integration processes in the Western European countries must go to the function of relations with the Eastern European countries, just as they are placed in relation to England and the neutral countries, that is, the countries of the Third World, is increasingly gaining ground. This means that the concept of integration should be approached from a far more broadly and elastically elaborated viewpoint.

There can be no doubt that the concept of a firm integration of "Little Europe" contains *neocapitalist tendencies* in relation to economic planning and the greater intervention of the state in economic affairs. In this connection the problem immediately arose of whether technocratic or democratic tendencies would be dominant in Europe. Bloc federalists or integrationists show a marked technocratic tendency, while we can say that they find their opposite number in the socialist bloc in theoreticians of socialist stateism and a centrally planned economy. If such concepts were imposed upon both Western and Eastern Europe, they would probably hamper the process of improving relations, for they would emphasize the political division in the field of economy itself. This, of course, would be far from beneficial, and many realize this. Leonard Beaton (England) asked the question in Brighton, in 1967: will England's joining the Common Market "threaten its political achievements", for since Napoleon's time, the European countries have been accustomed to more authoritative moves, while the English strictly adhere to democratic parliamentary practice? Will not the spirit which

rules among the "technocrats" in Brussels bring into question the responsibility of political representatives before their voters? Naturally, it is hard to avoid a conflict among the technicians of economic planning and politicians, i.e. between the bureaucracy and political control, and thus this problem applies both to individual countries and regions, and to larger communities of such regions. Thus one should, in efforts to create a political Europe, take into consideration the fact that "the democratic rights and legal means of every citizen" are guaranteed. It is our belief that Europe will produce a model of social self-management, starting from the Yugoslav experiences, which will be imposed upon the industrially more developed countries with continued automation and the differentiation of primary, secondary and tertiary economic activities under conditions of "the consumer society".

*Instances of nationalism*, of which Europe has not completely rid itself, even after its experiences with German and Italian fascism, are often cited as an obstacle to European integration. Federalists place the accent on a supernational organization, and consider that one should, in East-West relations, negotiate and reach agreement only at the level of "one and the other community" (e.g. between the CEE and Comecon), while the de Gaulleists hold that there can also be relations at the level of "one nation — another nation", that is, collective agreements must not be made to the detriment of the opportunities of individual nations to reach bilateral contracts. Although the de Gaulleists were sharply attacked because of their "nationalist tendencies", it should be said that the effort to expand integration to the frameworks of traditional Europe, i.e. from the "Atlantic to the Urals" goes in their favour. We could here cite a Yugoslav view, which states that in a certain sense, one can defend the de Gaulleist policy, and that "if de Gaulle's break with the NATO Pact means the first step in a general reorganization of the system of security in Europe, then his step should be considered as the first step not of French nationalism, but of European patriotism".

The well-known Czechoslovak intellectual, M. Goldstuecker expressed the view a few years ago, in connection with the significance and role of nations in European relations, that the only nation in Europe which is not yet completely constituted, and which thus represents a certain problem, is the German nation. The Europeans are obliged to invest a certain effort in order to have the German people find the place and dignity which belongs to it in Europe by its position. In reference to the position

of nations in the European organization, he said that "we are living in a historic period when the principle of national organization is inadequate and obsolete for Europe. The European nations have not yet, however, found another principle of organization to replace the national one. We are living in a period of transition." M. Duverger pointed out that from the historical and cultural standpoint it was desirable for Europe to preserve all the variety and specific features contributed by individual national cultures. (He probably had in mind the feeling of greyness which attacks the European when he finds himself in the United States of America.)

At the present moment there are no psychological conditions for abandoning national frameworks and transferring to a federal system. De Gaulle's idea of a Europe as a "community of homelands" seems much closer to the Europeans. However, it becomes clear at the same time that in the economic, technical and scientific sense, no European country (except the USSR) can exist by itself. The epoch of autarchic national systems has passed. Thus Goldstuecker expressed the view that there was no power (except the USSR and the USA) which would be capable of maintaining its own defence, its own economy, and its own science. In relation to the role of nations, Goldstuecker concluded: "The future belongs to the social system which will have the organizational capability of following the amazing development of thought and knowledge as speedily as possible." The frameworks for such a system are, in contemporary conditions, offered only by Europe in its entirety.

Indubitably, the conditions for a frank dialogue among the intellectuals of socialist and non-socialist countries are better today than ever before. The reasons for this lie both in the rejection of dogmatic Marxism in the socialist countries, and in the strengthening of socialist thought in the non-socialist ones. But apart from, or in spite of ideological reasons, a still insufficiently defined feeling of European solidarity, which is constantly growing, appears in the true economic, cultural, scientific, and even political orientation of the European countries towards one another.

Professor L. Lombardo Radice (a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party) pointed out in the discussion on "The Opening of European Marxism" in Munich that the abandoning of dogmatism in Marxist theory is not merely the expression of momentary tactics of the workers' movement, but an expression of new awarenesses in the field of the study of the theories of Marxist thought

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and the tasks of the contemporary workers' movement. Marxism and the working class movements of Europe are faced with many new questions which they must provide the answers for, such as the questions of specific roads to socialism for individual European countries, the need for a wide coalition of all progressive forces, and for frank dialogues with all political partners or ideological opponents. One such need is the dialogue with progressive Christians, whose religious beliefs do not represent an obstacle to their joining the Communist party in the struggle for socialist goals. The strengthening of socialist tendencies in the catholic masses is evident. However, what is most important is the fact that ideological differences must not, and cannot be an obstacle to the settlement of current political, economic and scientific issues which demand joint action on the European plane.

In connection with concrete relations between East and West on the political and economic plane, the well-known fact was confirmed that the existence of NATO on the one hand, and Comecon on the other, could not prevent the increasingly intensive cooperation and exchange in the economic field, which demonstrates the inadequacy of bloc military-political organization, as well as the fact that it is not in a position to prevent processes of cooperation and rapprochement on the economic and cultural plane. Restrictions of the concept of Europe to the Western or non-socialist countries not only do not correspond to geographic and historical features, but do not even correspond to the factual state in reference to relations in the economic sphere. Theoreticians of "Little Europe" beneath the American "nuclear umbrella" have denied the true development of European relations, and will continue increasingly to deny it. Labourite Roy Hattersley formulated the following unequivocal view: "Opting for a "small" political Europe is theoretically possible, but it is most probable that the time for it has already passed, as is shown by the fact that it was barely mentioned in Brighton. For it can now be seen that the Europe of the Six cannot play the role originally conceived for it by its founders in the realm of defence or of developed industrial technology".

The concept of Europe appeared in four variations in the discussions: a) a Europe of the Six (the Brussels variation), b) a Europe of non-socialist countries (the Brussels variation plus Scandinavian and neutral countries), c) a non-socialist-socialist Europe (without the Soviet Union, and d) a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals". The first version has already been abandoned, while the second has proved

impossible to execute precisely because of the third and fourth variations. The slogans which could be heard said from "Brest to Bucharest" (third version) and from "Atlantic to Urals". The former slogan does not exclude Great Britain, though it may seem to. The usual counter in discussion to the fourth version is a call to polarization with the two super powers — the USA and the USSR — which should at the same time be excluded, primarily in the military sense. This argument however, is insupportable if one takes into account the fact that the *Rapatzky plan* provides for the abolishing of the Warsaw Pact in the case of the simultaneous abolition of NATO, along with the strong neutralization and de-nuclearization of central Europe. There can be no doubt that in the military-political sense, European integration demands a new organization of security on the basis of peaceful coexistence relying precisely on the abolishment of the present opposing military blocs. If one does not take military-strategic reasons into account, then the third variation loses weight and can be considered only as a strategic stage in the development of European integration, and not as a definite solution.

Naturally, the representatives of the socialist countries rejected any speculation which would be aimed at separating those countries from the Soviet Union, with the intention of leading them to revise their social system. Such intentions should be definitely abandoned in the moves to integrate Europe! When former British Minister Amery proposed that England exchange its "privileged and priority relations" with the USA for relations with Europe, and that the countries of people's democracy should behave in the same vein, Hungarian representative Professor Retzei energetically refused this. If by "priority and privileged relations" one means military pacts, then Rapatzky's plan annuls them. If, on the contrary, they refer to economic relations, then it is a question of defining the economic relations of each country with other countries, and one must, in fact, assume that these relations will develop on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. If, again, one has in mind cultural and ideological relations, it is hard to define what "priority" could mean, for each country develops in accordance with its own social values and in the spirit of free relations with all others.

#### EUROPE AND THE THIRD WORLD

Perhaps Europe's lagging behind and the loss of its position is nowhere as evident as in relation to the Third World. This does not refer to the elimination of colonialism in Africa.

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The case is equally evident in relation to Latin America. It is a fact that the countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia still have a large number in the intelligentsia which was educated in Europe and which feels tied to its scientific and cultural heritage. However, Europe's influence in those countries is being increasingly pushed out by the lag in the scientific and technical sense, by the widening of the "technological gap" between the USA and the European countries, and by growing investments of American capital. The developing countries, naturally, have a great need not only of economic assistance, but also of scientific, expert and cultural aid. Following the path of precipitous transformation they encounter a multitude of new problems, and above all the problems of building up a new civilization. The days of colonialism, with missionaries and adventurous generals, have gone forever, and very complex ways and means are being sought today for relations among the developed and underdeveloped countries.

The representatives of those countries seek and expect such assistance. However, they refuse, as did the well-known Brazilian economist Professor Fortuda in Grenoble in 1967, to have this assistance considered some kind of "gift" to the developing countries. Professor Fortuda showed by means of "ladder economics" that countries with a higher organic composition of capital always draw major super-profits from the less developed ones, although they invest capital in the form of "assistance". The speedy technological development of our times, however, is conducive to widening this discrepancy and super-profits are constantly growing. The solution, understandably, lies in evening out the technological level of production. But there are also many other problems linked to the transformation of archaic civilizations, which was particularly pointed out by African representatives.

The dialogue with representatives of the Third World showed that Europe is losing its positions, that there are realistic foundations for its influence in intellectual ties, but that its possibilities will in future primarily depend on the settlement of its internal links and cooperation in the fields of science and technology.

#### A REALISTIC MODEL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

When speaking of European integration, we must imagine the principles and roads which would help to gradually put it into effect. In other words, like any process or social action which sets itself a certain goal, it must clarify

a definite strategy for this integration. It seems to us that the following principles should be borne in mind:

1. European integration cannot be put into effect under conditions of wartime policy, even if it is only called "the cold war", but must be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence among the European nations.

2. Integration processes must not be defined starting from the supremacy of the military, economic, or any other sphere of relations, but it must be borne in mind that there must be a relative independence of political, economic, scientific-technical, cultural and ideological relations. Any doctrinary patterns may be harmful. Integration processes presuppose a certain pluralism of the social spheres of life and international relations.

3. Every country will, in a sovereign manner, in accordance with its socio-economic structure, define the methods of its participation in those integration processes, coming out on principle for their implementation.

4. Processes of integration must not in any way hamper the normal processes of social progress of individual countries, their structural and socio-political transformation. Just as the socialist countries recognize "special paths for different countries on the road to socialism", so the capitalist countries must recognize the specific course of development of individual non-socialist countries.

5. The problem of Europe's integration is not only a practical political, i.e. economic or technological issue, but also, and primarily, a question of a certain spiritual unity. Hence it is necessary to propagate those cultural values which Europe has developed in the course of its history. It goes without saying that the idea of socialism is also included in those values. Work on the promotion of cultural-historical European values is not only as important as practical organizational issues, but is even more significant than they are. The development of "European patriotism" does not under any circumstances mean a tendency towards European isolation, "European chauvinism" or "spiritual imperialism", for the universality of human values is one of the essential achievements of European culture.

The first point needs no detailed comment, for the principles of peaceful coexistence were formulated with extreme clarity in the Belgrade Declaration by the nonaligned countries.

As regards the second point, it is extremely important to comprehend that many essential social processes often take place within the frameworks of old and obsolete socio-political structures, which survive by inertia, without, up to a certain critical point, hindering progressive processes. Thus, for instance, it is quite possible even in the present political constellation in Europe, which means without touching upon its present political relations, to approach the settlement of a problem which seems to us most acute — namely, that of scientific and technological integration. There are no serious obstacles in the way of forming a *network of European institutes* in all major fields of scientific progress, which, in terms of their size and the status of scientific workers, could successfully compete with other major institutions in the world, and which would put an end to the "exhaustion" of European scientific cadres. Naturally, as shown by economic practice itself and by discussions on it, nothing stands in the way of scientific institutes linking up with essential sectors of economic development, or of production branches themselves reaching agreement on a European scale. Here we have in mind, primarily, the production of computers and other extremely expensive machinery on which technological development for all European countries depends. Naturally, the construction of such institutes and the conclusion of such economic arrangements does not exclude the participation of the USA or the Soviet Union. There are no principled reasons to prevent the latter. It is essential that the European countries make available their scientific and intellectual potential for the realization of this task.

It is also necessary to point out that in the field of economic relations the concepts of some centralistically inclined economic planners, within the European Economic Community or Comecon, which are aimed at first organizing their own market in a disciplined and planned manner in all dimensions of economy, as a precondition for European integration, would not be constructive, and would represent a serious obstacle to integration processes. It must be realized that planning appears in the field of economic relations as a necessity in the power and basic industries, while in the realm of mass commodity production free initiative and the market itself play an increasing role. This applies equally to conditions of neo-capitalism and to conditions of the socialist economy. Such development will doubtless demand that some problems be settled on the basis of multilateral contracts and agreements, while others will be settled on the basis of bilateral consensus. The economy today excludes centralized and streamlined mo-

dels, and it is necessary to be aware of "the polycentrism of economic planning" or the pluralism of the economic organization of production processes (quite different in primary than in secondary, and different in secondary than in tertiary activities).

All these processes can develop successfully within the frameworks of the existing political organization of Europe, with a little goodwill, however much it may otherwise be desirable to change the latter in the spirit of a new system of European security, in order to prevent all European countries, for instance, from finding themselves in a position in which they must follow the military adventures of American imperialism.

As far as the third and fourth points are concerned, it is easy to assume, with regard to the existing socio-economic and ideological differences among European nations, that the processes of participation of individual countries or groups of countries will not develop according to a single pattern, and that some will be inclined to be more active in one field than another. Development tendencies are steadily advancing in the direction of a certain *convergence* of problems, so that differences will be more evident in the ways of solving them in individual phases than in terms of goals. By way of example let us note that the need for scientific and technological production (computers) will immediately emerge as a joint task without any major possible differences. The forming of European scientific institutes (with CERN and others) has already become a European practice, albeit insufficiently developed. In the same way, the development of production will demand increasing integration and coordination in the field of the power industry and the distribution of sources of raw materials and their extraction, as well as coordination in some basic industries. The integration of telecommunications and traffic and transport means need not even be pointed out!

But simultaneously to these convergent processes, marked contradictions will remain in the production of goods for wide market consumption (which will largely take on the character of luxury goods), where the tempo and inventiveness of production remain decisive factors, and as such require a "free market". This will, of course, apply to all countries. In such a situation it is easy to assume that one should leave a certain freedom to individual nations in order that they may be able to develop their capabilities in a market economy. Such processes apply equally to planned socialist economies and to planned capitalist economies. It hence seems to us that it would be in the spirit of European

economic development to assume that the socialist and non-socialist countries will be faced with the same problems in this province, and that in some matters these problems will require close coordination, while in others they will require free initiative. One should also view the autonomy and sovereignty of individual states from this aspect.

All concrete and direct political and economic problems cannot push the development of ideological ties among European intellectuals, contacts and discussions which lean towards European integration, into the background. Rapprochement among peoples is not merely our continental task today, it is a world necessity. But continental cooperation with its foundations in Europe's cultural tradition is an essential precondition for the contribution of Europe to rapprochement among peoples and peace in the world.

Discussions on the ideological meaning of Europe in the world have shown that it is precisely Europe which is the champion not only of the *universality* of human values, for this universality has been pointed out by other major non-European civilizations, but also of a certain *rationalism* which has brought about contemporary science and rational thought in general, and of *humanism* which presupposes the possibility of human activity in the transformation of the social conditions of life, which holds that man lives in a world which is made "to his measure", and has reached its fullest expression precisely in radical socialist humanism. These ideas, which Europe can be proud of in the face of all of mankind, are strong enough to suppress all barriers and hostilities among nations and people which stem from various irrational, regressive and aggressive tendencies such as nationalism, imperialism and racism. As no idea is a definite achievement of human culture, but must always be fought for and won anew, with each generation and each man, it is the duty of progressive people on our continent to lend them full content and to suppress with determination any revival of those reactionary tendencies which caused Europe's reputation so much harm before and during the Second World War, with the emergence of fascism. The phase of disappointment and resignation which flooded the continent in the fifties is now behind us, while we have ahead of us new tasks and responsibilities with which we must decisively come to grips.

(Translated from the Serbo-Croat by  
MAJA SAMOLOV)